You can tell an "oldtimer" by the fact that they still use MPH. My 172 POH and the checklist are both in knots. 
Yup,Steve,
You've got the "old timer" part right but I didn't "type" what I posted, the entries were cut and pasted from a 1975 POH for the then current regs.
I'm much more comfortable speaking in knots, as well, but also realize that the subject matter addressed by Aviojet had little to do with the 0.15% difference between Knots and MPH but, rather, the additional wear and tear on the airframe coerced onto the airframe by a pilot foolish enough to use POH approved "normal" landing practices that constitute a airspeed increase well within the noise factor from highest to lowest normal approach. I also concur, by the way, with Brett as to the potential abuse to which the airframe may be subjected to by the use of high drag flap configurations. The biggest risk to a zero flap approach and landing is the exposure to excessive "float" in the flare increasing the total landing distance (short field situations), not a hard touchdown. With zero flaps it is very easy to over rotate in the flare and experience a balloon (float down the runway). Not good, of course, but the low drag configuration improves the potential for a "non-event" recovery.
The actual risk of an unexpectedly hard touchdown is much greater as flaps are extended if, for instance, the flare is high and the pilot tries to hold the nose high in hopes of salvaging the landing but instead causes it to stall and impact terra firma in an unintended fashion due to the high drag rapidly depleting the airspeed and allowing the aircraft to stall. The only viable solution to such a situation is to add sufficient power to prevent the stall and re-establish an appropriate glide path to touchdown...all of which, of course, flies in the face of the valid reason for using flaps which is to shorten the landing distance on minimum runways. In addition, the greater the flap setting the more aggressive the addition of power must be to prevent an ooops! event from following.
Although doing so would, perhaps, not be my preferred method it is entirely possible that the pilot's instructor opted to train him to this point using only the "normal" no flaps approach and landing techniques so as to minimize the need for situational evaluation that might have proved distracting and confusing during this "one time in your life" first solo flight. Such an approach from the instructor is a fully supportable one and the fact that an "experienced" SUV chose for whatever reason to drive in front of the airplane at a less than propitious moment.
As an analyst for the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System since early 2003 I've analyzed reports of hundreds of reports of faulty landing techniques that have resulted in a variety of imperfect outcomes. I'd have to say the events at Roanoke would, however, have been pretty unique and, despite my 60 odd years of experience I would be very reluctant to pretend to assign blame based on what is available. The one thing I'd be pretty sure of is that a student pilot on his first solo flight probably (and properly) had his/her full attention on just pointing the nose in the right direction and getting safely on the runway. I would never expect his/her situational awareness to be expanded to the same degree as that of myself or, perhaps...although the jury is still out, Aviojet. The man had his hands and mind "full".
One thing I do believe I can say is that the event itself is neither qualifying or disqualifying proof of the student's ultimate skills but is certainly a result of a less than perfect relationship of the physical facilities at his place of learning. Blame could, perhaps, be assigned to those responsible for that state of imperfection but would be too little too late...although doing so has become a way of life for attorneys at law.esq types.
Ted