Howard Rush and Paul Walker

[Fredvon4]

Sorry Ken...we might agree on Human only control but you and I would be mostly wrong

We can certainly cite a few system that induce problems but the reality is a LOT of augmentation and automation make some very complex systems safer and manageable

We are NOT driving or flying in fully automated cars and airplanes right now today--- because as humans we have a fear that GM, Ford, and Boeing do not know how to reduce...

OTR autonomous cargo trucks are actually on the highway RIGHT NOW Today and the Truckers unions do NOT like the tech....insurance companies love the tech...Autonomous trucker is NEVER drunk or tired and will always react to slow down and save a accident

Most big cities right now are running test programs for autonomous Buss systems

My 2019 Jeep Cherokee  has systems I love at age 63.... lane follow...bitches at me if I wander and gawk......gives feedback and tries to steer car to center of the lane.... has glitches that scare me a bit......sharp turn on hwy while at high speed and loss of or NO lane painted lines confuses the system....right now it is an assistant...other companies have it as a driver and YOU are the assistant....coming to a new car near you very soon

I absolutely love my RADAR managed Adaptive Cruise control.....I set the speed and distance to follow (three levels of distance) and she will run my car at the speed set and if car ahead slows we slow never getting too close...traffic clears and we all accelerate back to speed set...very reliable and easy to use system

[Bill Adair]

What needs fixing is the culture.  Why they went to passive control override makes me not want to ever get on another new Boeing jet.  I want pilots who have their lives at stake flying my planes not some programmer whose only exposure is his/her job. 
Ken

Good points by all!

"Pilot Instantly in Command"  should be a solemn oath made by all avionics software programmers, employed in the aircraft industry!

I'm surprised this problem was not identified during System Integration Lab testing by Boeing. The Boeing Military branch has been doing System Integration Lab (SIL) testing for years, but to my knowledge our 777, was the first commercial liner to employ SIL testing, and the outstanding success of that program is legendary!

Love Boeing airplanes, but I've now added the 737 Max to my list of "Do Not Fly Aircraft" until this problem is resolved.

The list was previously populated solely by AirBus, and a few third world aircraft I won't mention.

Bill

[Howard Rush]

Got this link from my Brother.  It is a pretty comprehensive review.  How can they be so stupid?

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/

Ken

There may be some flaws in the article, but if it’s true, you have a good question.  I can tell you that twenty years ago they weren’t.

[Ken Culbertson]

There may be some flaws in the article, but if it’s true, you have a good question.  I can tell you that twenty years ago they weren’t.

As I mentioned earlier my brother is a test pilot with over 8000 hours, much of it multi engine and in flight simulators. He thinks it was to save time in their race to get orders away from AirBus.  He had never heard of Boeing putting in a totally passive overide but his sources inside Boeing are not talking - wonder why!

Ken

[Howard Rush]

I’m not sure what you mean by passive override,  but systems that add some input such as the MCAS have been on Boeing airplanes for 50 years or so. Examples are mach trim and yaw dampers. Fly-by-wire flight controls on the 777 and 787 allow lots of little tweaks. All work well, as far as I’ve heard.

[Fredvon4]

AS early as 1976 our AH* 1H Cobras , AH 1 ModS, and later 1979~1982 ---Production S AH series Cobras as well as FMC Cobras had SCAS----   Stability and Control Augmentation System---  all later models, ECAS** and FMC*** also incorporated some SCAS scheme

*Bell Attack Helicopter

Point is a few analog or computer automated control systems have been in production for over 30 years now......jest saying... old school E-6 and E-7 Fred was trained on all these systems a LONG time ago
** Enhanced Cobra armament system ...
*** Fully Modernized Cobra...

I guess, from my experience, that an autonomous system can assess a bad or potentially bad flight condition a LOT faster than a human, and if programmed properly, can apply the correct action to alleviate the bad flight condition

Do Not ask me about a UH-60 Black Hawk Weisbaden AFB circa 1992~1993 with wing fuel pods that killed the crew on landing due to WAY OUT OF CG* on ground effect hover.... General Jerry Rutherford, V Corps CG,  is still personally pist at me for my post accident report.....( he lost two personal friends in the tragedy and to this day hates Army Aviation...)

*transfer fuel pump failure so one wing store fuel tank was full and one was empty.... in flight no problem....flies like an airplane on rotor and side (wings)_....  BUT in landing ground effect hover all of a sudden thousands of pounds heavy on ONE wing...too late to power up and recover,  pitched port and dived to ground...killing all aboard....Wife and I Actually saw the crash from our Wiesbaden AFB patio.....and subsequently ran to the air field to assist in the post crash recovery..... too little too late....still smell that crash....

Point is ----an Industry wide (Navy, AF, ARmy, Coast Guard, and all commercial Syskorsky UH 60 Black Hawk) users were issued new software and sensors to detect improper fuel flows from the external wing fuel pods

Like Boeing will ....MOST contractors always learn from the mistakes and cut corners and usually decide to fix problems rather than pay out court decisiones.....wink

[Ken Culbertson]

I’m not sure what you mean by passive override,  but systems that add some input such as the MCAS have been on Boeing airplanes for 50 years or so. Examples are mach trim and yaw dampers. Fly-by-wire flight controls on the 777 and 787 allow lots of little tweaks. All work well, as far as I’ve heard.

What I meant was that the pilot was unaware of the override.

Ken

[Ted Fancher]

    Negative static stability margin.

    Brett

Like the 747 cargo-liner accident in the mid-east with the tank-type vehicle aft-cargo shift on take-off?

Ted

[Dave Hull]

And unaware of automated functions and how to revert to full manual controls like Scandinavian Airlines 751 with the auto throttle-back....

Divot McSlow

[Perry Rose]

The 747 accident was a huge failure of the FAA in approving the loading manual for that airline. The loadmaster, going by the manual as he should, used nylon straps to secure several many ton wheeled vehicles. The straps were installed nearly vertical providing tons of vertical restraint and hardly any fore/aft restraint. The aft vehicle broke loose and went through the aft bulkhead and into the stabilizer jack screw which gave the pilots little if any elevator control.

[Dave Hull]

I'm having a little trouble with Perry's conclusions. It seems like there is more than one issue here. A loadmaster ought to be trained to actually understand tie points, load limits, and geometry.  I had to go thru all of that for certification for just lifting items with a crane or hoist. If you are going to trust him with your life for all the calculations to get the CG within range, I don't think understanding proper tie-down methods--notwithstanding a deficient manual if that was the case--isn't asking too much.

Dumping the responsibility on the FAA is not correct. Someone was responsible for generating an operating document, not the FAA. Might have been Boeing; might have been the aircraft conversion company; might have been the operator. The FAA might have to review it, but since when have we taken responsibility to do the job right away from the performer, and insist it was the regulators fault? This is the old red herring in manufacturing quality, as well. It never seems to go away....

Knowledge + Training + Tools + Clear Goals = Success

Dave

[Perry Rose]

The airline writes how it will perform a task and the FAA reviews it and accepts it and now it's gospel. Then the airline goes by the approved manual. The loadmaster in this case just loaded and tied down cargo according to the manual. The loadmaster doesn't fly with the plane to monitor the cargo. Or didn't in this case. I don't know who employed the loadmaster. I went through loadmaster school at Shepard AFB in 1976. I was shocked at how they used straps instead of chains on something of this weight. Probably to carry more cargo as straps are a lot lighter than chains. The loading manual didn't spell out how the straps were to be positioned just how many to use for a given weight. The loadmaster wasn't chastized in this accident.
As an aside, if the straps were positioned 30 degrees from the floor to the vehicle in line with it's centerline for fore/aft restraint and 30 degrees to the right and left of the vehicle centerline and the floor for sideways restraint nothing would have happened which tells me that this loadmaster wasn't military trained. 

I made a correction as the jack screw is for the stabilizer trim not the elevator.

[phil c]

Just add some latest news.
A report on the Lion Air crash that a pilot was taking a third seat ride for his next flight on that plane the day before.  He discussed the MCAS and how he'd had to recover from a sudden pitch down.  He explained how they recovered.  During the flight the PIC had a pitch down but caught it very quickly and the rest of the flight was uneventful.

Another article, from an experienced airline pilot.  He said the 800-MAX was built closer to the margin of stability.  the MCAS was changed to make the plane respond to the pilot more like the previous 737 version.  The MCAS, and the possibility of pitch down, was intentionally held out of training materials.  He suggested training pilots with MCAS turn off so they could learn how to fly the current plane and be able to react if the MCAS acted up. 

Another article that the pilot training and manuals initially made no mention of the pitch down possibility.  After the Lion Air crash Boeing apparently notified all the users and update/recommended that training include the possibility and what to do if it occurred.

The FAA got information from the Lion Air crash that the stabilizer jack screw was in full up position after the crash.  That was the first indication that "some similarities to the previous crash" occurred.  Satellite imaging had previously showed data of the Lion Air flight that indicated many early altitude changes just before the crash.

Another article about the changes in management style at Boeing and the push for profits and getting the new plane out as soon as possible.

[FLOYD CARTER]

I understand Boeing is making a "software patch" to fix the problem.

Anytime I have to rely on computer code to save my hide, I will politely refuse.

[Tim Wescott]

I understand Boeing is making a "software patch" to fix the problem.

Anytime I have to rely on computer code to save my hide, I will politely refuse.

Don't fly, then!  It's not all software, but everything runs through a 'puter these days.

It can be done safely (witness all of the airplanes that aren't falling out of the sky), but it can be screwed up, too.  It's really inherently no less safe than an equally complicated mechanical system -- it's just that you couldn't pack that much mechanical complexity into a large airport terminal, much less one little ol' jetliner.

[Perry Rose]

It's called a 737 but it's not. I believe it shares the same basic wing as all the other 737 models and that is the root of the problem. The rest of the plane is too heavy for the wing.

[Ted Fancher]

The airline writes how it will perform a task and the FAA reviews it and accepts it and now it's gospel. Then the airline goes by the approved manual. The loadmaster in this case just loaded and tied down cargo according to the manual. The loadmaster doesn't fly with the plane to monitor the cargo. Or didn't in this case. I don't know who employed the loadmaster. I went through loadmaster school at Shepard AFB in 1976. I was shocked at how they used straps instead of chains on something of this weight. Probably to carry more cargo as straps are a lot lighter than chains. The loading manual didn't spell out how the straps were to be positioned just how many to use for a given weight. The loadmaster wasn't chastized in this accident.
As an aside, if the straps were positioned 30 degrees from the floor to the vehicle in line with it's centerline for fore/aft restraint and 30 degrees to the right and left of the vehicle centerline and the floor for sideways restraint nothing would have happened which tells me that this loadmaster wasn't military trained. 

I made a correction as the jack screw is for the stabilizer trim not the elevator.

i.e. my reference to the 747 restraint failure accident.  My only reason for posting was to insure that my interpretation of Brett's    "Negative static stability margin" comment was accurate.  I was familiar with the load restraint failure and its cause. 

My understanding is that the ultimate crash was both the result of the aft CG shift and the resultant failure of the crew's ability to "re-trim" the stabilizer setting to compensate even when combined with available down elevator.   Inasmuch as it (the CG setting as a % of MAC) was already pre-set before takeoff for the initial takeoff CG location and inasmuch as CG locations toward the aftmost of the usable/stable settings for takeoffs are common for fuel efficiency purposes would imply that only a modest degree of further aft movement due to the massive weight of the vehicle and its shift might well place the CG in a location that resulted in inadequate pitch force available to overcome the nose-up pitch induced by the CG shift.  The resultant stall and initial spin entry were thus inevitable.

I have not read the accident report itself so my thoughts should be taken for what they're worth...speculation.

Ted

p.s. For the benefit of those unfamiliar with air carrier aircraft: In general, pitch trim is accomplished by varying the pitch angle of the stabilizer itself, not via a tab on the elevator to "drive" the elevator up or down with respect to the stabilizer.  The elevator, as a result, will retain its "lower" drag "in trail" relationship to the stabilizer rather than changing the airfoil that results to a draggier cambered section.  This type of trim--like much having to do with the stab/elevator--is employed to minimize the drag associated with "holding the pitch attitude of the aircraft" in a "hands off" condition thus improving fuel economy.

[Dave Hull]

There are something like 493 737-900ER's out there flying, some since 2007. These have a maximum takeoff weight of 6,500 lbs more than the new 737Max8. Since the -900ER's don't fall out of the sky, this story is not just about the wing not having enough lift capacity.

Dave

[Peter in Fairfax, VA]

As far as trusting electronic computers, that horse has been out of the barn a while.  Many, many man-rated systems we encounter daily rely on software.

That said, the integration of the computers with controls remains a challenge, and it looks like 737 pilot displays vary widely, with each customer making choices as to what their pilots see.  Both the software-controlled displays vary, and the hardware varies.  For example, only some carriers purchase heads-up-display hardware.  Some carriers configure displays for AOA disagree and/or AOA readings, some do not.

The loss of life is tragic. We expect all parties involved will use the event to foster improvement.  Based on the article below, this is happening.  Air transport has a long history of improvement based on experience.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-airlines-is-adding-new-angle-of-attack-indicators-to-its-737-max-fleet/

[Brett Buck]

I understand Boeing is making a "software patch" to fix the problem.

Anytime I have to rely on computer code to save my hide, I will politely refuse.

     That ship has long since sailed, you are, right now.  Nearly every new airplane (and a lot of older ones) is fly-by-wire or otherwise dependent on software for its basic function. You worked on a program upon which human civilization currently depends, it is fly-by-wire.

    Software adds complexity, but is absolutely necessary for many functions that couldn't practically be done otherwise. The mere fact that we are having a discussion about it, here, is evidence of that.

    The problem is that it permits systems of such byzantine complexity that when something unexpected happens, you require people to be far more expert at troubleshooting than they would have otherwise. You might recall what happened when one individual shifted one word, one bit, to the left, when trying to set a clock, that confounded one of the smartest people I have ever known for several hours.

   Howard's earlier comment is where the debate lies. "If a pilot did something wrong, we tried to figure out how to prevent that action" - that sort of reasoning is *why* these things tend to snowball, because if you are not exceedingly careful about what you are "protecting" against, you create the sort of issue seen here. Enough of this, and you require the pilots or other operators to understand how to out-think an exceedingly complex system, in real time, while headed towards the ground with 100 people on board.  Of all people, *Trump* - not notable for his engineering expertise - put his finger on it the first day, saying he didn't want his pilots to have to be Einstein to figure it out.

   A lot the other comments (here and on SSW) were along the lines of "well, it it looks like there is a problem, disable the system (by turning off the jackscrew motor, presumably at the breaker), we all knew about it" are overly simplistic. The MCAS system is one possible issue of a *vast array* of other issues that could cause controllability problems.   You can't "train" people to avoid this sort of problem in the usual sense of the word, it does not necessarily yield to procedures and checklists. You frequently have to know, in extreme detail, exactly how *all* of the system features work, in much more detail, and how to perform troubleshooting on these potentially very complex systems.

   I have done a lot of things in the aerospace business, and can do any type of task required of someone in my field from data entry to complex non-linear analysis. But I have made my reputation by being one of the guys who can unwind these extremely complex systems from minimal data.


     I am always the one calling for *simplification* to the maximum extent possible, because it's almost absurdly easy to put the troubleshooting out of the range of any but the most accomplished experts. And I assure you, this appears to be an exceedingly rare skill that cannot practically be educated or trained into someone, no matter what you do. No one want to pay these guys what you would have to, to hang around for endless hours for the relatively rare occasions they are required, and the experts don't want to sit in a jumpseat on an Indonesian 737 commuter flight for endless hours waiting around for something to happen.

   Because of that, the engineers should all be *very hesitant* to design something that requires special processing to overcome a more fundamental issue, and they should all be able to be safely controlled by hitting the "turn off all enhancements" switch, a big red switch on the control yoke, and flying the airplane.

    I don't actually know what the deal is here or whether the speculation to date is correct or not. But everyone designing these things should realize the essential nature of how it will be used and who will be using it.

    Brett

[Ken Culbertson]

 
   Because of that, the engineers should all be *very hesitant* to design something that requires special processing to overcome a more fundamental issue, and they should all be able to be safely controlled by hitting the "turn off all enhancements" switch, a big red switch on the control yoke, and flying the airplane.

You make some good points but there is one thing that we are forgetting.  A lot of our pilots, especially those that started out in the "Fly by Wire" era and those that did not come from the military don't seem to be very good at flying the airplane without the computer. 

Ken

[Steve Thomas]

I spent 40 years and 26,000 hours as an airline pilot, mostly flying captain.  I don't recall ever seeing a stall warning device or stick shaker.  I wonder who decided we needed them?

Al

I guess it became hard to argue against them when the consequences of deep stalls in T-tail jets became apparent.

I’ve got nothing against systems which keep us out of nasty corners of the flight envelope - but they should be complementary to good basic flying skills, and not a replacement for them. We also have to be able to disable them and make other arrangements when they’re not working properly. It’s not as if things like MCAS are really new, either - the 60s-70s era fighter-bombers we flew had stability augmentation, command augmentation and stall inhibitor systems (via analog computers!). They worked just fine, but were never any substitute for proper stick-and-rudder skills.

Maybe part of the problem was a change in the philosophy around automation. Instead of being something which could improve safety by reducing the pilot’s workload (which is how I saw what we had in things like the 744 and 767), it became almost an end in itself, seen by some as a substitute for proper flying skills. Look at the profileration of 3rd world and/or low cost carriers, needing lots of pilots, ideally at the lowest pay rates possible. The end result is aircraft (and in some places, training) for the lowest common denominator. Would you believe the Airbus Instructors’ Guide used to have a statement along the lines of ‘Training in unusual attitude recoveries is not necessary in Airbus aircraft, due to the built-in flight envelope protections’!? (That line quietly disappeared a few years ago...) And so we were told that the old-style stick-and-rudder guy was a dinosaur, and what was needed now was more of a systems manager, and someone with a couple of hundred hours in the sim should be just as good as a pilot with 20000 hrs and a strong flying background. That’s partly true - it’s fair to say that automation management, mode awareness, and all the human factors stuff is a vitally important part of being an airline pilot. But then so is a solid grounding in all the old-school stuff, as we’ve seen from a number of recent accidents where it was sadly lacking.

Still, flying is exponentially safer than it ever was before, and a big part of that is down to the systems in the aircraft. We just have to accept that the systems don’t always work as they should, and be able to cope with it when they don’t.

[Brett Buck]

You make some good points but there is one thing that we are forgetting.  A lot of our pilots, especially those that started out in the "Fly by Wire" era and those that did not come from the military don't seem to be very good at flying the airplane without the computer. 

    There is no such thing as flying without the computer on a fly-by-wire system (military or otherwise), and, many of the capabilities of the airplane wouldn't be possible and/or practical to implement without a computer.

    My point is that flying an airplane is a teachable skill, whereas complex systems analysis with limited information in extreme stress situations cannot be taught, and certainly doesn't particularly lend itself to procedures and checklists. Something funny happens, it might be MCAS, or it might be one of the other 100,000 lines of code. You have to be *extremely careful* how complex you make it.

     Brett

[Ken Culbertson]

    There is no such thing as flying without the computer on a fly-by-wire system (military or otherwise), and, many of the capabilities of the airplane wouldn't be possible and/or practical to implement without a computer.

    My point is that flying an airplane is a teachable skill, whereas complex systems analysis with limited information in extreme stress situations cannot be taught, and certainly doesn't particularly lend itself to procedures and checklists. Something funny happens, it might be MCAS, or it might be one of the other 100,000 lines of code. You have to be *extremely careful* how complex you make it.

     Brett

You are absolutely correct.  My point was that much of the teachable skill is not being taught anymore.  Many pilots just don't know what to do in that second or two that is the difference between a scary situation and a phone call to your next of kin.  I am not saying this from personal experience but through what has been relayed to me from my brother who is a 20 year test pilot who trained airline pilots how to live through the day when "something funny happens" among other things that a sane person would say "no way I am doing that" to.

You are also correct about the "fly by wire" requiring a computer especially in "modern" fighter jets.  If you have ever watched an F-18 land on a carrier you will see the stabalator moving up and down like a scared rabbit yet the pilot is barely moving the "stick".

Ken

[John Lindberg]

I heard something on the radio concerning Pratt-Whitney engines verses the engines Boeing uses, but since I don't have a clue what caused the crash (crashes), I'll keep my mouth shut! 

[Fredvon4]

Airline industry growth is 7%~9% per year for last many years and growing exponentially as many former third world countries are climbing into the 21st century and creating a true middle class

Boeing and AirBus Dominate. They produce an amazing amount of new for sale aircraft each year

Militaries around the world do not graduate enough trained pilots to fill the civilian cargo and people mover needs

Training and certification is a high cost factor

We have the ability right now this day to fly a 747 heavy, with pax, anywhere in the world with no-one in the cockpit.....

I have a family member, high up in the auto insurance industry...a major company... they very much want Automated automobile transport systems used.  Very predictable, very reliable, very verifiable, near perfect EVIDENCE in any accident ....litigation can be passed to the manufacture if there is a hardware or software failure......

Talk above that I will not dispute....a well trained human should be IN CONTROL
BUT we don't seem to be able to produce any WELL TRAINED human in enough quantity

Seems counterintuitive to me---- but the last few warrants and officers I knew that retired army aviation were sticker shocked at how little any airline was willing to pay for a commercial pilot.... they recalled back in the 70s~80s airlines were paying a LOT for a commercial pilot

Most that I knew got headhunted by dozens of Life flight Hospital programs that included a move across country...two guys I know well, went to Wisconsin and traded WO-3 pay for triple digit pay after American Eagle Insulted them with their pay package

Just rambling here

But seem to me the industry is NOT interested in WELL TRAINED PILOTS...generally   well at least they do not seem willing to properly compensate for the enhanced skills

Have a local rancher (and restaurant owner) neighbor that flies Cargo transport...BIG planes...Dallas to overseas...CRS does not let me remember the aircraft...he is happy with the routing, scheduling, and compensation .......But when we do a single malt scotch evening (grin) he complains loudly about the cost cutting maintenance

[Ken Culbertson]

Maybe I was misleading in my simulator comment - my bad.  What you cannot simulate is the way you react to stress when you know that everybody is going to die if you get it wrong.
Ken

I must disagree about the stress level in a simulator. In the sim. the thing that is going to die if you get it wrong is your job and you have to live with the humiliation that goes with that. The stress in the sim. is just as great as in the plane if not greater.   Airlines cannot use airplanes to train anyone. Sim. time is far less expensive and less dangerous. You don't want to practice imminent stalls in any large or heavy aircraft or any other unusual maneuver.

Your response got my curiosity genes all riled up so I thought I would run this past an acknowledge expert if this field.  His response seems to confirm both of our opinions.

So here it is:

"I think the 737Max  accidents are a combination of multiple events aligning. 
   Rush to compete with Airbus
   Some flaws in the software design
   Reduction in FAA workforce and oversight- driven by the Republicans 
   Boeing believing that if this emergency manifested- Pilots would be able to react and shut off the trim system because it manifests it self similar to other emergencies- No need to add more words to confuse the pilots. No extra training needed because of the above.

Pilots today are automation cripples.  They didn’t grow up hand flying aircraft. In the 70-80’s 75% of US airline pilots were prior military. After 9/11 the number is more like 30%.  One of my first things I look at is how to disengage all of the automation.  I believe the accident pilots did not disengage the trim.

As far as Simulators- Great training tools, but not a replacement for actual flying. Most of the stress felt in a Sim is performance anxiety. I don’t want to look bad. As long as the sim doesn’t not provide negative training its very valuable. True you can be exposed to multiple emergencies and scenarios that you could not practice in the air and just thinking about it may not be enough."

Ken

[Howard Rush]

I have no inside information, so the following is again my speculation and my opinion.

"I think the 737Max  accidents are a combination of multiple events aligning. 

Airplane accidents all pretty much are.   A chain of things has to go wrong.

Rush to compete with Airbus

Not me.  I've been retired for ten years.

   
Some flaws in the software design

I doubt that.  I think the problem is upstream of software.  The system could have been built with no software and would have had the same outcome (in my opinion).

Reduction in FAA workforce and oversight- driven by the Republicans 

The Boeing-FAA certification relationship worked fine 20 years ago and probably still does.  Now it's getting attention, which is good.  Kellyanne is saying the FBI will investigate, which is kinda like sending the FBI to investigate whether sharp stab leading edges help stunt planes.  I hope such an investigation concludes that the FAA should be adequately funded, but it looks like we're on the way to ceding airplane certification credibility to the Chinese. 

Boeing believing that if this emergency manifested- Pilots would be able to react and shut off the trim system because it manifests it self similar to other emergencies- No need to add more words to confuse the pilots. No extra training needed because of the above.

I don't think that's the reasoning behind the no extra training.  Look at the Seattle Times article somebody linked above.  I'll leave it at that.

One thing I have heard from the inside is that some guys are on suicide watch.  My first thought was that it's too bad they're being watched.  Probably the wrong guys are suicidal, though.  Then I wondered if things played out the way I think they did, and if I were the MCAS systems guy, if my link in the chain would have held. 

[Dan McEntee]

   I was disappointed that the Department of Justice was brought in to look at things so soon. Another government agency whose name may be an oxymoron. That starts to imply criminal intent or negligence when an official cause and accident report has not been released and verified yet, and that's just not right. Like Howard mentions, if you have paid attention to previous accidents over the years, there is almost never one underlying cause, but a cascade of events to combine for the catastrophe to occur.  I'm still thinking that flight crew inexperience will be the big element here. The Lion Air crash is a prime example. It would have gone down the day before with a different crew, if an experienced pilot from another airline had not been in the jump seat and paying attention. That's two full crews that were unaware how to address the issue. How many more might be out there in the third world countries? That still leaves the decision to be made if there was a flaw in the design or software, but operational history will back up that it could be handled with simple procedures that properly trained and experienced pilots already know. This far down the line from the Ethiopian accident, I'm surprised at least a preliminary report has not been released, given the world wide impact that the grounding has caused.   If I sell a car, motorcycle or even a model airplane, I'm kind of careful who I sell it to. Especially if there is some know mechanical issue that needs to be resolved, even though I am completely upfront and vocal about what it is. If I can tell the buyer is a complete idiot and should not own it, I won't sell it to him. It may not be possible to do such a thing on a scale such as a commercial airliner, but it makes simple sense to not sell a product to a customer that does not have the means to properly train it's people on the machine and properly maintain and service it. And that very subject may be an underlying issue here also.
  Just my 2 cents worth,
  Dan McEntee

[Bob Reeves]

My view considering the latest reports without really knowing what I am talking about.

The airlines are trying to shift the blame to Boeing instead of admitting the pilots screwed up.
Why have we not had any issues with US pilots.
Why on earth would you turn on the very system that caused the problem after turning it off. Because you didn't have enough experience to be able to recover and you were in a panic.

I could be all wet just knowing what I see on the news but it still makes me wonder why we have not had any issues with US pilots and carriers.

[Peter in Fairfax, VA]

Just posted a link to the preliminary report in a new thread.  The new thread has a new subject.

[Tim Wescott]

Why have we not had any issues with US pilots.

There have been reported incidents with US pilots, who turned the MCAS system off.  So, the airlines try to shift the blame to Boeing, and US citizens try to shift the blame to furriners.  Hmmm -- nope, can't be a pattern here!

[Joe Yau]

My view considering the latest reports without really knowing what I am talking about.

The airlines are trying to shift the blame to Boeing instead of admitting the pilots screwed up.
Why have we not had any issues with US pilots.
Why on earth would you turn on the very system that caused the problem after turning it off. Because you didn't have enough experience to be able to recover and you were in a panic.

I could be all wet just knowing what I see on the news but it still makes me wonder why we have not had any issues with US pilots and carriers.

Bob,  Here are some insights on the Max 8's  design and issues..

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1249KS8xtIDKb5SxgpeFI6AD-PSC6nFA5/view?fbclid=IwAR2zzimN8-M2BUSi7N4Wpcgu4FkNtapkqk_SNrQNt2dZWFmmkCDP1ZAezjE

[Howard Rush]

Bob,  Here are some insights on the Max 8's  design and issues..

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1249KS8xtIDKb5SxgpeFI6AD-PSC6nFA5/view?fbclid=IwAR2zzimN8-M2BUSi7N4Wpcgu4FkNtapkqk_SNrQNt2dZWFmmkCDP1ZAezjE

In my opinion, that person is almost completely full of @#$%.

Edit: I did not write "@#$%".  I wrote an actual word.  This is an example of software surprising a user with something unintended.  The MCAS issue, I think, is a bit different. 

[Brett Buck]

Bob,  Here are some insights on the Max 8's  design and issues..

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1249KS8xtIDKb5SxgpeFI6AD-PSC6nFA5/view?fbclid=IwAR2zzimN8-M2BUSi7N4Wpcgu4FkNtapkqk_SNrQNt2dZWFmmkCDP1ZAezjE

     Howard's assessment of the article seems about right, bovine scatology - another "big time keyboard expert" gassing on with great authority about something they have no personal experience or training to do. With a dose of conspiracy, which is the hallmark of a crank.

     Brett

[Joe Yau]

     Howard's assessment of the article seems about right, bovine scatology - another "big time keyboard expert" gassing on with great authority about something they have no personal experience or training to do. With a dose of conspiracy, which is the hallmark of a crank.

     Brett

O.k..  so, what’s your take on it..?

[Brett Buck]

O.k..  so, what’s your take on it..?

   I reserve my "take" until there is some objective information to work with.

    Brett

[Joe Yau]

   I reserve my "take" until there is some objective information to work with.

    Brett

There are lots of updated infos on facebook, youtube, etc.  Here are just some current ones.


 

[Tim Wescott]

There are lots of updated infos on facebook, youtube, etc.  Here are just some current ones.

Well, yes, but is that an indication truth, or an indication that the press has a strong herd instinct?

[Dennis Nunes]

If it’s on the internet it must me true! 

Dennis

[Joe Yau]

Well, yes, but is that an indication truth, or an indication that the press has a strong herd instinct?

There are much more infos out there.. and seems most all point towards the same conclusion.

[Brett Buck]

There are lots of updated infos on facebook, youtube, etc.  Here are just some current ones.

   None of those things looks like an engineering or failure review board report.

    Recall that I do this sort of thing for a living for the last nearly 40 years, on things a lot more critical than an airliner, and my "detector" is as finely honed as they get.

    Brett