stunthanger.com
General control line discussion => Open Forum => Topic started by: Tim Wescott on March 12, 2019, 07:14:46 PM
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Howard Rush and Paul Walker retire from Boeing, and then airliners start falling from the sky.
Coincidence?
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I think not! VD~
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Howard Rush and Paul Walker retire from Boeing, and then airliners start falling from the sky.
Coincidence?
This is more in Howard's area, I think.
People seem to be rapidly jumping to conclusions as to cause, I would wait until/if we ever get a real explanation.
Brett
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Flat Battery ?
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This is more in Howard's area, I think.
People seem to be rapidly jumping to conclusions as to cause, I would wait until/if we ever get a real explanation.
Brett
Is it possible that the vortex generators came off????
Larry, Buttafucco Stunt Team
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Maybe the lines were hooked up backward? Or handle was picked up the wrong way?
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Just a reminder that something like 350 people are dead, perhaps a bit soon for the jokes?
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True, 350 people died in that aircraft crash. Putting that in context, about 3,300 die per day in road crashes. Even though the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 incident was rare and recent, 10,000 people have died in the three days since then in road crashes. From an engineering, economics and even basic human compassion perspective, which transportation focus would yield a stronger return on investment, road or aircraft safety?
https://www.asirt.org/safe-travel/road-safety-facts/
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True, 350 people died in that aircraft crash. Putting that in context, about 3,300 die per day in road crashes. Even though the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 incident was rare and recent, 10,000 people have died in the three days since then in road crashes. From an engineering, economics and even basic human compassion perspective, which transportation focus would yield a stronger return on investment, road or aircraft safety?
https://www.asirt.org/safe-travel/road-safety-facts/
How many people were in car crashes and didn't die? THAT is the important statistic.
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Just a reminder that something like 350 people are dead, perhaps a bit soon for the jokes?
I feel for the victims.
And I like the thought of people making witty jokes about me when I'm gone -- as long as they're based on knowledge, not supposition.
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This is more in Howard's area, I think.
People seem to be rapidly jumping to conclusions as to cause, I would wait until/if we ever get a real explanation.
Brett
I was getting mine in when there's still enough of a dearth of evidence that it could be true.
I wish I had production figures for how many are out there, and how many passenger-miles (or flight hours, or whatever). The Lyons Air crash sounds like it was at least partially the fault of the operator; I'm waiting on hearing information about the Ethiopian Airlines crash.
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I was getting mine in when there's still enough of a dearth of evidence that it could be true.
I wish I had production figures for how many are out there, and how many passenger-miles (or flight hours, or whatever). The Lyons Air crash sounds like it was at least partially the fault of the operator; I'm waiting on hearing information about the Ethiopian Airlines crash.
Well, smoking/possibly on fire, and parts or luggage falling out, sure doesn't seem like a problem with the control system to me.
Brett
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My fishing buddy retired from the Renton plant where they assemble 737's, more recently than Paul (who worked on the F-22, not commercial). Or Howard, who worked at Everett (747) plant. But I'm real sure that nothing he did (which wouldn't have been very much!) wouldn't have caused a 737 to crash. He refers to Boeing as "the place I used to waste my daylight hours".
I've recently seen a couple of episodes of "Why Airplanes Crash" on Weather Channel. One detailed a crash where the computer system essentially crashed the plane, because the flight engineer had a switch set wrong. I hope I didn't confuse a couple of different episodes/tragedies. I tend to not watch stuff like that, because I'm not a big fan of getting in a "silver silo" in the first place. A lot of it is just putting my life in the hands of a total stranger. If Ted or David was known to be the pilot, I'd be cool with that. On the other hand, if "Bob's Your Uncle" was a BOAC pilot, I'd never get on the plane. LL~ Steve
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If you have 10 "eye witnesses", you will get 10 different versions.
As Brett said, it's best to wait for the expert's evaluation.
I believe, any automatic control system should be capable of over-riding by the pilot.
Electronic systems are handy, but I don't trust any of them.
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I believe, any automatic control system should be capable of over-riding by the pilot.
Electronic systems are handy, but I don't trust any of them.
I totally agree.. I'm quite surprised that the pilots wasn't even aware of the implementation of the "MCAS" system (basically an auto Anti-Stall system) on the first 737 Max-8 that crashed. and I heard it's not in the manual either.
https://youtu.be/zfQW0upkVus
https://youtu.be/mCRvrWVJjUs
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This is more in Howard's area, I think.
People seem to be rapidly jumping to conclusions as to cause, I would wait until/if we ever get a real explanation.
Brett
Tip Stall.... LL~
Ken
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Well, the President just ordered all of the 737 MAX models grounded. Some sort of satellite data from Canada showing a similar flight pattern to the Lion Air crash. There was a report I didn't get to read, that the FAA had come out with some mandated changes for the 737 MAX in relation to the Lion Air crash, and was ready for release to the media at the time of the Ethiopian crash. Both airplanes with just minutes into take off. I read a report where due to significant air frame changes on the recent models ( larger and more powerful engines) and other aerodynamic issues, this auto system was developed in answer to that. This required a new take off check list. The crew of the Lion Air air airplane had done the check list in that airplane before, but did not on the fatal flight. Like most air liner accidents, it is usually a cascade of small events that lead to the fatal event. I would suspect that this won't be any different , and given the locations of the accidents, I'll guess that some sort of failure on the part of the crew will be part of the answer. It for sure a sad day for the families involved including some Americans. but there have been a heck of a lot of these new airplanes racking up a lot of hours in this country with no issues. Some complaints from flight crews about manuals and such, but nothing serious enough for them to refuse to fly them which I think is their prerogative, isn't it? I'll be watching this closely.
Type at you later,
Dan McEntee
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Sounded like a software issue.
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Sounded like a software issue.
+1
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There are a lot of "experts" here airing opinions about the problem.
Yes, they are grounded. Why? I don't know. FAA claims some additional info that they haven't shared is the reason, not Trump's
Twitter post.
Until they know definitively why they crashed, inspections and actions mean nothing. Let's wait until the black box tells it tale, and then understand the event. Then concrete answers and actions can be given.
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+1
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350 people are dead, perhaps a bit soon for the jokes?
In America, it is a good tradition to memorize the dead with a positive memory. Humor is a positive memory. Positive thoughts is the blessing the departed give us.
I particularly liked the upside down handle joke.
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They have had the data recorders for a few days now, haven't they. I would have thought there would be at least a preliminary report on the findings. Unless those findings influenced the action. This grounding is really an unprecedented action, isn't it? I can't recall a mass grounding of a commercial aircraft on this scale. Military aircraft, yes, but I can't recall any commercial aircraft after a series of accidents. I have seen on line news reports that say Boeing suggested it. Stay tuned for further developments as they become available.
Type at you later,
Dan McEntee
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They have had the data recorders for a few days now, haven't they. I would have thought there would be at least a preliminary report on the findings.
According to NPR they're on their way to Germany for analysis. From which I gather they haven't been looked at yet.
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[quote author=Dan McEntee l I can't recall a mass grounding of a commercial aircraft on this scale. Military aircraft, yes, but I can't recall any commercial aircraft after a series of accidents. I have seen on line news reports that say Boeing suggested it. Stay tuned for further developments as they become available.
Type at you later,
Dan McEntee
[/quote]
The deHavilland Comet was grounded in 1954, due to improper riveting and overs tressed bolt locations.
Larry, Buttafucco Stunt Team
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According to NPR they're on their way to Germany for analysis. From which I gather they haven't been looked at yet.
Correct, and why anything you might see about it is premature/wild speculation. Some of the "learned descriptions" I have heard about how the system worked and how it failed were so patently ridiculous that no responsible human being would have permitted it to be designed that way. And they didn't - I haven't been terribly impressed with the sophistication of the aircraft controls designs I have seen, but that's largely because they are *extremely* conservative, particularly Boeing. For very good reason.
Most of what I have heard and read about this problem is immediately dismissible as bullshit on even a casual analysis. No one on the internet seems to know the first thing about it, so assume everything you read about it is uninformed nonsense.
Brett
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[quote author=Dan McEntee l I can't recall a mass grounding of a commercial aircraft on this scale. Military aircraft, yes, but I can't recall any commercial aircraft after a series of accidents. I have seen on line news reports that say Boeing suggested it. Stay tuned for further developments as they become available.
Type at you later,
Dan McEntee
The deHavilland Comet was grounded in 1954, due to improper riveting and overs tressed bolt locations.
Larry, Buttafucco Stunt Team
Hi Larry;
Well, I was born in 1955, so that was before my time! The British Navy flew them until quite recently as the Nimrod sub hunter, though, correct? The square windows on that airplane played a part in it also, if I remember correctly There was issues with the Lockheed Electra in civilian use and it was in service for a short time, but I don't remember a mass grounding.,and our Navy flew them , again , until quite recently as the P-3 Orion. The local news tonight also reminded me about the Boeing Dream Liner groundings after some battery fires. But there were only a few in service at that time, I think, only 3 or 4? Quite a difference from what is happening now. The local news also said that a Southwest Max-8 that landed here was the last one to touchdown. Some people on board were completely oblivious to the whole story and didn't even know of the crashes, or what kind of airplane they were on! I wonder what life is like on their planet?? I do think that Boeing has a good airplane, and I think they are confident that they got a good airplane. I would walk out the front door and get on one right now with a current US crew. I'm still thinking that the foreign operators will be a common contributing factor in the final analysis.
Type at you later,
Dan McEntee
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Historically, our FAA seems eager to conclude "pilot error" ion just about everything. Then, they look for clues to back their first opinion.
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My fishing buddy retired from the Renton plant where they assemble 737's, more recently than Paul (who worked on the F-22, not commercial). Or Howard, who worked at Everett (747) plant. But I'm real sure that nothing he did (which wouldn't have been very much!) wouldn't have caused a 737 to crash. He refers to Boeing as "the place I used to waste my daylight hours".
I've recently seen a couple of episodes of "Why Airplanes Crash" on Weather Channel. One detailed a crash where the computer system essentially crashed the plane, because the flight engineer had a switch set wrong. I hope I didn't confuse a couple of different episodes/tragedies. I tend to not watch stuff like that, because I'm not a big fan of getting in a "silver silo" in the first place. A lot of it is just putting my life in the hands of a total stranger. If Ted or David was known to be the pilot, I'd be cool with that. On the other hand, if "Bob's Your Uncle" was a BOAC pilot, I'd never get on the plane. LL~ Steve
I’m pretty sure you’re misquoting me. I always thought I was useful or at least potentially useful.
The suspect system came along after l retired, so all I know about it is speculation from fellow flight controls geezers at our Christmas party. It was not a festive party.
Details of accidents come out in NTSB reports several months later and are usually published in Aviation Week.
This makes me sad.
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Historically, our FAA seems eager to conclude "pilot error" ion just about everything. Then, they look for clues to back their first opinion.
I doubt that. My homeboys never assumed pilot error. You can’t improve anything that way. If a pilot did something wrong, we tried to figure out how to prevent that action.
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One news report said that the "stick shaker feedback" could exert up to 90 lbs of force for the pilot to overcome. That seems like alot. Is he supposed to put his feet on the "dash"?
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Sounded like a software issue.
Software will almost certainly be involved, but what little I understand about the system (from general press reports after the Lyons Air crash) is that it's got aerodynamic, mechanical, software, and electrical elements to it. It could be any one of a whole lot of things, or (more likely, these days) some combination of a lot of things.
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Is is true that the 737 series all use the same basic wing?
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One news report said that the "stick shaker feedback" could exert up to 90 lbs of force for the pilot to overcome. That seems like alot. Is he supposed to put his feet on the "dash"?
The key words here are "news report"
Ken
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Thought I might add a bit to the speculation. My little brother is director of the Lincoln Test Flight facility at M.I.T. I asked him if he had any idea what is going on. He said that they are following it closely but the test pilots he knows at Boeing are being very closed lipped. He did say two things that really scare me. First is that some airlines actually do not tell pilots of changes in their automated systems if they feel the risk of failure is very small and that pilots today are really not being taught how to fly the airplane, they are just there to monitor the automated systems.
The first one I can understand, the second one however is dangerous. When I fly I want to know that the guy up front can fly the plane with half of the rudder gone, the hydraulics leaking and the instruments out at night in a thunder storm. Maybe a bit over the top but you get the drift. My brother used to teach airline pilots how to do that - up in the sky. Now they learn it in a simulator or not at all and it is just not the same. Those poor 737 Max pilots never got to hit the reset button and try it again.
Technology is a wonderful thing but when we let it progress faster than our ability to master it we create a monster.
God Help us - Ken
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Ken I agree with all you said EXCEPT...your belief about simulators is dead wrong sir......if you ever can...go fly one---- most today are exceptionaly well designed and can induce any flight operation/condition/fault/attitude/weather/total failure you could possibly dream up
OTHO simulator time is expensive, as are the training hours for the type rated pilot....so somewhere in the chain is the Training plan for that airline...
Some expend a LOT of bucks-- and others the bare minimum.....
If you only got 15 minutes of simulation on turning OFF the two switches of AoA auto pilot for a false AoA low airspeed condition...then you and many others might just die a tragic death
MY assumption on both these tragedies is poor and incomplete pilot training...NOT Pilot error
I was one of MANY school (Rucker Safety Center) aircraft crash investigators spending nearly 4 years to find out why Army UH 60 Sikorsky Helicopters lawn darted and killed a lot of soldiers....
insert "seen a thing or two so know a thing or two"
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Sim time is available to the general public in Atlanta at the Delta Flight Museum. It's a 737-200. While my visit was relatively short and I did not schedule or pay for sim time, I enjoyed this museum.
https://www.deltamuseum.org/visit/visit
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Ken I agree with all you said EXCEPT...your belief about simulators is dead wrong sir......if you ever can...go fly one---- most today are exceptionaly well designed and can induce any flight operation/condition/fault/attitude/weather/total failure you could possibly dream up
OTHO simulator time is expensive, as are the training hours for the type rated pilot....so somewhere in the chain is the Training plan for that airline...
Some expend a LOT of bucks-- and others the bare minimum.....
If you only got 15 minutes of simulation on turning OFF the two switches of AoA auto pilot for a false AoA low airspeed condition...then you and many others might just die a tragic death
MY assumption on both these tragedies is poor and incomplete pilot training...NOT Pilot error
I was one of MANY school (Rucker Safety Center) aircraft crash investigators spending nearly 4 years to find out why Army UH 60 Sikorsky Helicopters lawn darted and killed a lot of soldiers....
insert "seen a thing or two so know a thing or two"
Maybe I was misleading in my simulator comment - my bad. What you cannot simulate is the way you react to stress when you know that everybody is going to die if you get it wrong and you don't know what "it" is yet. I have flown a F-18 simulator but it was a long time ago and from what my brother tells me they are 1000% better now.
Ken
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I have flown a F-18 simulator but it was a long time ago and from what my brother tells me they are 1000% better now.
Ken
That must have been a blast!
I got to fly one of the Boeing motion base simulators for the 747-400 while working at Boeing. My boss at the time was a former Simulator section supervisor, and squeezed a couple of us in one night, when they were not training commercial pilots three shifts per day, and seven days per week.
One of the other guys had a private ticket, and still managed to crash the 747. I had a great time on my turn, and managed to get that beautiful airplane up and back down again without crashing (thanks to my boss sitting in the right seat). Might have collected a few runway lights on that seemingly endless roll out however! ;D
Prior to that I'd spent many hours with the MS Flight Sim, and a rather basic PC game called "Ace's Over Europe". Those PC games, and my R/C flying were a big help, but I've no illusions of being able to fly a real airplane that way.
Bill
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Ken so true and I did not intend my post lauding the great simulators as perfect substitutes for actual seat time with an good instructor pilots.... and real conditions, shear, wx, birds....drones
One report I heard mid week was they found the boxes fairly fast. In good shape but parent country does not have the lab to decode the data so they mailed off the boxes to Europe...
AP news at the time speculated weather it would be France, England, or Germany
Fox prognosticators speaking for FAA would like to also examine the data
I would like to believe the POTUS grounding the airframe was based on inside data and serious consultation with Boeing....but politically, theses days who the hell really knows the truth of anything...
heard one guy today state that he doubted the same failure mode of the second crash was related to the first AoA crash...his argument was...EVERY 737 Max8 pilot, world wide, would know exactly the emergency procedures for that fault mode
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Maybe I was misleading in my simulator comment - my bad. What you cannot simulate is the way you react to stress when you know that everybody is going to die if you get it wrong.
Ken
I must disagree about the stress level in a simulator. In the sim. the thing that is going to die if you get it wrong is your job and you have to live with the humiliation that goes with that. The stress in the sim. is just as great as in the plane if not greater. Airlines cannot use airplanes to train anyone. Sim. time is far less expensive and less dangerous. You don't want to practice imminent stalls in any large or heavy aircraft or any other unusual maneuver.
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After I retired from United Air Lines I worked for a number of years at the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) as an "Expert" Analyst (their description, not mine) of aviation incidents reported by pilots, maintenance, ATC, Flight Attendants etc. from all forms of aviation, air carrier, general aviation, occasional military etc. ASRS receives in the neighborhood of 80 to 90+ thousands of reports a year. These reports are limited to "incidents" and we had/have no official part of accident investigation although synopses and narratives of pertinent reports may be utilized by associated authorities during investigations of accidents.
Because of the interest in the -800s due to the two accidents I went to the ASRS Web Site and conducted a rudimentary search of the last 100 reports submitted from -800 crew members. A quick review resulted in only two reports potentially relevant to the current speculation and I thought I'd copy and paste the narratives provided (all such reports are de-identified prior to publication as to who and where specifically are concerned).
The first is obviously one that will be of interest with respect to the current investigation: Notes in black parenthesis for clarity by Ted.
Day 3 of 3 departing in a MAX 8 after a long overnight. I was well rested and had discussed the recent MAX 8 MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) guidance with the Captain. On departure, we had strong crosswinds (gusts > 30 knots) directly off the right wing, however, no LLWS (Low Level Wind Shear) or Micro-burst (Dramatic "down draft of air and precipitation) activity was reported at the field. After verifying LNAV (Lateral Naviation Auto Flight Mode), selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI (Vertical Speed Indicator i.e. rate of climb/descent) to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior to the GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System") sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. We discussed the departure at length and I reviewed in my mind our automation setup and flight profile but can't think of any reason the aircraft would pitch nose down so aggressively. (Underline added for emphasis)
Synopsis
B737 MAX First Officer reported that the aircraft pitched nose down after engaging autopilot on departure. Autopilot was disconnected and flight continued to destination.
The second report, alas, got lost when I inadvertently opened a new window on top of it. If I find it I'll rethink whether or not to bother to add it as it was only related in that it was a minor, quickly resolved auto flight system rate of climb anomaly. A minor anomaly that might well mean more during an investigation this intensive. Sorry to have dumped it.
If anyone wants to do a search of their own here's a link by which to start your search. It is, by the way a resource open to the public and nothing I'm using inappropriately: https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/database.html
Ted
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Thanks for your insight and input Ted. If you find the other report, I would be interested in your thoughts on that also. I had heard once, that on the day of the Ethiopian crash, the FAA had ready for release a mandated design change on the Max as a result of the investigation of the Lion Air crash, but I had not heard anything else about it since. I'm curious as to what that was. The day the grounding was called for, it was reported that data from a Canadian satellite had detected "similarities in the with the Lion Air crash final flight path" or something similar. Makes me wonder what other info they were considering that wasn't released that dictated parking the whole fleet? I also wonder, does production cease, or at least the final preparations for and the delivery on new aircraft? I'll be the sale of Tums to the guys that are responsible for replacing the grounded airplanes with replacement equipment has gone way up! I haven't heard anything about the pinch on scheduling that this may be causing either. The MAX hasn't been in service that long, but a fair number of them are out there in service, so I would think it has to make an impact on replacing them with equipment that you can utilize the current crews on also. A lot of logistics involved!
Type at you later,
Dan McEntee
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Got this link from my Brother. It is a pretty comprehensive review. How can they be so stupid?
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
Ken
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Very interesting reading. What would be a possible scenario where a commercial airliner would enter a high speed stall, that would make it necessary to have a system like the MCAS?
Type at you later,
Dan McEntee
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Very interesting reading. What would be a possible scenario where a commercial airliner would enter a high speed stall, that would make it necessary to have a system like the MCAS?
Negative static stability margin.
Brett
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Very interesting reading. What would be a possible scenario where a commercial airliner would enter a high speed stall, that would make it necessary to have a system like the MCAS?
Type at you later,
Dan McEntee
Two that I know of. Airplanes with T tails have reduced tail effectiveness in the wake of a stalled wing. This caused loss of some BAC 1-11s. The British certification agency had us put a “stick pusher” on the 727 to prevent stalls. Don Shultz made a cartoon of their chief pilot riding the 727, saying, “bloody magnificent stick pusher.”
The other case is where the engines are low. When the airplane slows down the pitch-up moment from the engines stays the same while aerodynamic pitch-down moment from the wing and tail reduce as the square of airspeed.
Both are exacerbated by the tendency of swept wings to stall tips-first.
These aren’t usually high speed stalls, though, which is what you asked about.
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And all this computer stuff is now operating automobiles. How safe is that going to be with young drivers?
I understand that the F.O. on the Ethiopian plane had a whopping 200 hours total time.
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Further---managing wing flight control due to a narrow AoA vs speed is exacerbated by the placement of the Engines and their cowling .....I read elsewhere the the engine cowls induce a rapid rate of lift as AoA increases
FWIIW I have a Buy order in for Boeing stock at XXX price
I am CERTAIN they will fix this and then go on to fill the thousands of orders for this one aircraft
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Further---managing wing flight control due to a narrow AoA vs speed is exacerbated by the placement of the Engines and their cowling .....I read elsewhere the the engine cowls induce a rapid rate of lift as AoA increases
FWIIW I have a Buy order in for Boeing stock at XXX price
I am CERTAIN they will fix this and then go on to fill the thousands of orders for this one aircraft
What needs fixing is the culture. Why they went to passive control override makes me not want to ever get on another new Boeing jet. I want pilots who have their lives at stake flying my planes not some programmer whose only exposure is his/her job.
Ken
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Sorry Ken...we might agree on Human only control but you and I would be mostly wrong
We can certainly cite a few system that induce problems but the reality is a LOT of augmentation and automation make some very complex systems safer and manageable
We are NOT driving or flying in fully automated cars and airplanes right now today--- because as humans we have a fear that GM, Ford, and Boeing do not know how to reduce...
OTR autonomous cargo trucks are actually on the highway RIGHT NOW Today and the Truckers unions do NOT like the tech....insurance companies love the tech...Autonomous trucker is NEVER drunk or tired and will always react to slow down and save a accident
Most big cities right now are running test programs for autonomous Buss systems
My 2019 Jeep Cherokee has systems I love at age 63.... lane follow...bitches at me if I wander and gawk......gives feedback and tries to steer car to center of the lane.... has glitches that scare me a bit......sharp turn on hwy while at high speed and loss of or NO lane painted lines confuses the system....right now it is an assistant...other companies have it as a driver and YOU are the assistant....coming to a new car near you very soon
I absolutely love my RADAR managed Adaptive Cruise control.....I set the speed and distance to follow (three levels of distance) and she will run my car at the speed set and if car ahead slows we slow never getting too close...traffic clears and we all accelerate back to speed set...very reliable and easy to use system
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What needs fixing is the culture. Why they went to passive control override makes me not want to ever get on another new Boeing jet. I want pilots who have their lives at stake flying my planes not some programmer whose only exposure is his/her job.
Ken
Good points by all!
"Pilot Instantly in Command" should be a solemn oath made by all avionics software programmers, employed in the aircraft industry!
I'm surprised this problem was not identified during System Integration Lab testing by Boeing. The Boeing Military branch has been doing System Integration Lab (SIL) testing for years, but to my knowledge our 777, was the first commercial liner to employ SIL testing, and the outstanding success of that program is legendary!
Love Boeing airplanes, but I've now added the 737 Max to my list of "Do Not Fly Aircraft" until this problem is resolved.
The list was previously populated solely by AirBus, and a few third world aircraft I won't mention.
Bill
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Got this link from my Brother. It is a pretty comprehensive review. How can they be so stupid?
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
Ken
There may be some flaws in the article, but if it’s true, you have a good question. I can tell you that twenty years ago they weren’t.
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There may be some flaws in the article, but if it’s true, you have a good question. I can tell you that twenty years ago they weren’t.
As I mentioned earlier my brother is a test pilot with over 8000 hours, much of it multi engine and in flight simulators. He thinks it was to save time in their race to get orders away from AirBus. He had never heard of Boeing putting in a totally passive overide but his sources inside Boeing are not talking - wonder why!
Ken
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I’m not sure what you mean by passive override, but systems that add some input such as the MCAS have been on Boeing airplanes for 50 years or so. Examples are mach trim and yaw dampers. Fly-by-wire flight controls on the 777 and 787 allow lots of little tweaks. All work well, as far as I’ve heard.
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AS early as 1976 our AH* 1H Cobras , AH 1 ModS, and later 1979~1982 ---Production S AH series Cobras as well as FMC Cobras had SCAS---- Stability and Control Augmentation System--- all later models, ECAS** and FMC*** also incorporated some SCAS scheme
*Bell Attack Helicopter
Point is a few analog or computer automated control systems have been in production for over 30 years now......jest saying... old school E-6 and E-7 Fred was trained on all these systems a LONG time ago
** Enhanced Cobra armament system ...
*** Fully Modernized Cobra...
I guess, from my experience, that an autonomous system can assess a bad or potentially bad flight condition a LOT faster than a human, and if programmed properly, can apply the correct action to alleviate the bad flight condition
Do Not ask me about a UH-60 Black Hawk Weisbaden AFB circa 1992~1993 with wing fuel pods that killed the crew on landing due to WAY OUT OF CG* on ground effect hover.... General Jerry Rutherford, V Corps CG, is still personally pist at me for my post accident report.....( he lost two personal friends in the tragedy and to this day hates Army Aviation...)
*transfer fuel pump failure so one wing store fuel tank was full and one was empty.... in flight no problem....flies like an airplane on rotor and side (wings)_.... BUT in landing ground effect hover all of a sudden thousands of pounds heavy on ONE wing...too late to power up and recover, pitched port and dived to ground...killing all aboard....Wife and I Actually saw the crash from our Wiesbaden AFB patio.....and subsequently ran to the air field to assist in the post crash recovery..... too little too late....still smell that crash....
Point is ----an Industry wide (Navy, AF, ARmy, Coast Guard, and all commercial Syskorsky UH 60 Black Hawk) users were issued new software and sensors to detect improper fuel flows from the external wing fuel pods
Like Boeing will ....MOST contractors always learn from the mistakes and cut corners and usually decide to fix problems rather than pay out court decisiones.....wink
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I’m not sure what you mean by passive override, but systems that add some input such as the MCAS have been on Boeing airplanes for 50 years or so. Examples are mach trim and yaw dampers. Fly-by-wire flight controls on the 777 and 787 allow lots of little tweaks. All work well, as far as I’ve heard.
What I meant was that the pilot was unaware of the override.
Ken
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Negative static stability margin.
Brett
Like the 747 cargo-liner accident in the mid-east with the tank-type vehicle aft-cargo shift on take-off?
Ted
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And unaware of automated functions and how to revert to full manual controls like Scandinavian Airlines 751 with the auto throttle-back....
Divot McSlow
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The 747 accident was a huge failure of the FAA in approving the loading manual for that airline. The loadmaster, going by the manual as he should, used nylon straps to secure several many ton wheeled vehicles. The straps were installed nearly vertical providing tons of vertical restraint and hardly any fore/aft restraint. The aft vehicle broke loose and went through the aft bulkhead and into the stabilizer jack screw which gave the pilots little if any elevator control.
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I'm having a little trouble with Perry's conclusions. It seems like there is more than one issue here. A loadmaster ought to be trained to actually understand tie points, load limits, and geometry. I had to go thru all of that for certification for just lifting items with a crane or hoist. If you are going to trust him with your life for all the calculations to get the CG within range, I don't think understanding proper tie-down methods--notwithstanding a deficient manual if that was the case--isn't asking too much.
Dumping the responsibility on the FAA is not correct. Someone was responsible for generating an operating document, not the FAA. Might have been Boeing; might have been the aircraft conversion company; might have been the operator. The FAA might have to review it, but since when have we taken responsibility to do the job right away from the performer, and insist it was the regulators fault? This is the old red herring in manufacturing quality, as well. It never seems to go away....
Knowledge + Training + Tools + Clear Goals = Success
Dave
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The airline writes how it will perform a task and the FAA reviews it and accepts it and now it's gospel. Then the airline goes by the approved manual. The loadmaster in this case just loaded and tied down cargo according to the manual. The loadmaster doesn't fly with the plane to monitor the cargo. Or didn't in this case. I don't know who employed the loadmaster. I went through loadmaster school at Shepard AFB in 1976. I was shocked at how they used straps instead of chains on something of this weight. Probably to carry more cargo as straps are a lot lighter than chains. The loading manual didn't spell out how the straps were to be positioned just how many to use for a given weight. The loadmaster wasn't chastized in this accident.
As an aside, if the straps were positioned 30 degrees from the floor to the vehicle in line with it's centerline for fore/aft restraint and 30 degrees to the right and left of the vehicle centerline and the floor for sideways restraint nothing would have happened which tells me that this loadmaster wasn't military trained.
I made a correction as the jack screw is for the stabilizer trim not the elevator.
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Just add some latest news.
A report on the Lion Air crash that a pilot was taking a third seat ride for his next flight on that plane the day before. He discussed the MCAS and how he'd had to recover from a sudden pitch down. He explained how they recovered. During the flight the PIC had a pitch down but caught it very quickly and the rest of the flight was uneventful.
Another article, from an experienced airline pilot. He said the 800-MAX was built closer to the margin of stability. the MCAS was changed to make the plane respond to the pilot more like the previous 737 version. The MCAS, and the possibility of pitch down, was intentionally held out of training materials. He suggested training pilots with MCAS turn off so they could learn how to fly the current plane and be able to react if the MCAS acted up.
Another article that the pilot training and manuals initially made no mention of the pitch down possibility. After the Lion Air crash Boeing apparently notified all the users and update/recommended that training include the possibility and what to do if it occurred.
The FAA got information from the Lion Air crash that the stabilizer jack screw was in full up position after the crash. That was the first indication that "some similarities to the previous crash" occurred. Satellite imaging had previously showed data of the Lion Air flight that indicated many early altitude changes just before the crash.
Another article about the changes in management style at Boeing and the push for profits and getting the new plane out as soon as possible.
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I understand Boeing is making a "software patch" to fix the problem.
Anytime I have to rely on computer code to save my hide, I will politely refuse.
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I understand Boeing is making a "software patch" to fix the problem.
Anytime I have to rely on computer code to save my hide, I will politely refuse.
Don't fly, then! It's not all software, but everything runs through a 'puter these days.
It can be done safely (witness all of the airplanes that aren't falling out of the sky), but it can be screwed up, too. It's really inherently no less safe than an equally complicated mechanical system -- it's just that you couldn't pack that much mechanical complexity into a large airport terminal, much less one little ol' jetliner.
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It's called a 737 but it's not. I believe it shares the same basic wing as all the other 737 models and that is the root of the problem. The rest of the plane is too heavy for the wing.
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The airline writes how it will perform a task and the FAA reviews it and accepts it and now it's gospel. Then the airline goes by the approved manual. The loadmaster in this case just loaded and tied down cargo according to the manual. The loadmaster doesn't fly with the plane to monitor the cargo. Or didn't in this case. I don't know who employed the loadmaster. I went through loadmaster school at Shepard AFB in 1976. I was shocked at how they used straps instead of chains on something of this weight. Probably to carry more cargo as straps are a lot lighter than chains. The loading manual didn't spell out how the straps were to be positioned just how many to use for a given weight. The loadmaster wasn't chastized in this accident.
As an aside, if the straps were positioned 30 degrees from the floor to the vehicle in line with it's centerline for fore/aft restraint and 30 degrees to the right and left of the vehicle centerline and the floor for sideways restraint nothing would have happened which tells me that this loadmaster wasn't military trained.
I made a correction as the jack screw is for the stabilizer trim not the elevator.
i.e. my reference to the 747 restraint failure accident. My only reason for posting was to insure that my interpretation of Brett's "Negative static stability margin" comment was accurate. I was familiar with the load restraint failure and its cause.
My understanding is that the ultimate crash was both the result of the aft CG shift and the resultant failure of the crew's ability to "re-trim" the stabilizer setting to compensate even when combined with available down elevator. Inasmuch as it (the CG setting as a % of MAC) was already pre-set before takeoff for the initial takeoff CG location and inasmuch as CG locations toward the aftmost of the usable/stable settings for takeoffs are common for fuel efficiency purposes would imply that only a modest degree of further aft movement due to the massive weight of the vehicle and its shift might well place the CG in a location that resulted in inadequate pitch force available to overcome the nose-up pitch induced by the CG shift. The resultant stall and initial spin entry were thus inevitable.
I have not read the accident report itself so my thoughts should be taken for what they're worth...speculation.
Ted
p.s. For the benefit of those unfamiliar with air carrier aircraft: In general, pitch trim is accomplished by varying the pitch angle of the stabilizer itself, not via a tab on the elevator to "drive" the elevator up or down with respect to the stabilizer. The elevator, as a result, will retain its "lower" drag "in trail" relationship to the stabilizer rather than changing the airfoil that results to a draggier cambered section. This type of trim--like much having to do with the stab/elevator--is employed to minimize the drag associated with "holding the pitch attitude of the aircraft" in a "hands off" condition thus improving fuel economy.
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There are something like 493 737-900ER's out there flying, some since 2007. These have a maximum takeoff weight of 6,500 lbs more than the new 737Max8. Since the -900ER's don't fall out of the sky, this story is not just about the wing not having enough lift capacity.
Dave
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As far as trusting electronic computers, that horse has been out of the barn a while. Many, many man-rated systems we encounter daily rely on software.
That said, the integration of the computers with controls remains a challenge, and it looks like 737 pilot displays vary widely, with each customer making choices as to what their pilots see. Both the software-controlled displays vary, and the hardware varies. For example, only some carriers purchase heads-up-display hardware. Some carriers configure displays for AOA disagree and/or AOA readings, some do not.
The loss of life is tragic. We expect all parties involved will use the event to foster improvement. Based on the article below, this is happening. Air transport has a long history of improvement based on experience.
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-airlines-is-adding-new-angle-of-attack-indicators-to-its-737-max-fleet/
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I understand Boeing is making a "software patch" to fix the problem.
Anytime I have to rely on computer code to save my hide, I will politely refuse.
That ship has long since sailed, you are, right now. Nearly every new airplane (and a lot of older ones) is fly-by-wire or otherwise dependent on software for its basic function. You worked on a program upon which human civilization currently depends, it is fly-by-wire.
Software adds complexity, but is absolutely necessary for many functions that couldn't practically be done otherwise. The mere fact that we are having a discussion about it, here, is evidence of that.
The problem is that it permits systems of such byzantine complexity that when something unexpected happens, you require people to be far more expert at troubleshooting than they would have otherwise. You might recall what happened when one individual shifted one word, one bit, to the left, when trying to set a clock, that confounded one of the smartest people I have ever known for several hours.
Howard's earlier comment is where the debate lies. "If a pilot did something wrong, we tried to figure out how to prevent that action" - that sort of reasoning is *why* these things tend to snowball, because if you are not exceedingly careful about what you are "protecting" against, you create the sort of issue seen here. Enough of this, and you require the pilots or other operators to understand how to out-think an exceedingly complex system, in real time, while headed towards the ground with 100 people on board. Of all people, *Trump* - not notable for his engineering expertise - put his finger on it the first day, saying he didn't want his pilots to have to be Einstein to figure it out.
A lot the other comments (here and on SSW) were along the lines of "well, it it looks like there is a problem, disable the system (by turning off the jackscrew motor, presumably at the breaker), we all knew about it" are overly simplistic. The MCAS system is one possible issue of a *vast array* of other issues that could cause controllability problems. You can't "train" people to avoid this sort of problem in the usual sense of the word, it does not necessarily yield to procedures and checklists. You frequently have to know, in extreme detail, exactly how *all* of the system features work, in much more detail, and how to perform troubleshooting on these potentially very complex systems.
I have done a lot of things in the aerospace business, and can do any type of task required of someone in my field from data entry to complex non-linear analysis. But I have made my reputation by being one of the guys who can unwind these extremely complex systems from minimal data.
I am always the one calling for *simplification* to the maximum extent possible, because it's almost absurdly easy to put the troubleshooting out of the range of any but the most accomplished experts. And I assure you, this appears to be an exceedingly rare skill that cannot practically be educated or trained into someone, no matter what you do. No one want to pay these guys what you would have to, to hang around for endless hours for the relatively rare occasions they are required, and the experts don't want to sit in a jumpseat on an Indonesian 737 commuter flight for endless hours waiting around for something to happen.
Because of that, the engineers should all be *very hesitant* to design something that requires special processing to overcome a more fundamental issue, and they should all be able to be safely controlled by hitting the "turn off all enhancements" switch, a big red switch on the control yoke, and flying the airplane.
I don't actually know what the deal is here or whether the speculation to date is correct or not. But everyone designing these things should realize the essential nature of how it will be used and who will be using it.
Brett
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Because of that, the engineers should all be *very hesitant* to design something that requires special processing to overcome a more fundamental issue, and they should all be able to be safely controlled by hitting the "turn off all enhancements" switch, a big red switch on the control yoke, and flying the airplane.
You make some good points but there is one thing that we are forgetting. A lot of our pilots, especially those that started out in the "Fly by Wire" era and those that did not come from the military don't seem to be very good at flying the airplane without the computer.
Ken
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I spent 40 years and 26,000 hours as an airline pilot, mostly flying captain. I don't recall ever seeing a stall warning device or stick shaker. I wonder who decided we needed them?
Al
I guess it became hard to argue against them when the consequences of deep stalls in T-tail jets became apparent.
I’ve got nothing against systems which keep us out of nasty corners of the flight envelope - but they should be complementary to good basic flying skills, and not a replacement for them. We also have to be able to disable them and make other arrangements when they’re not working properly. It’s not as if things like MCAS are really new, either - the 60s-70s era fighter-bombers we flew had stability augmentation, command augmentation and stall inhibitor systems (via analog computers!). They worked just fine, but were never any substitute for proper stick-and-rudder skills.
Maybe part of the problem was a change in the philosophy around automation. Instead of being something which could improve safety by reducing the pilot’s workload (which is how I saw what we had in things like the 744 and 767), it became almost an end in itself, seen by some as a substitute for proper flying skills. Look at the profileration of 3rd world and/or low cost carriers, needing lots of pilots, ideally at the lowest pay rates possible. The end result is aircraft (and in some places, training) for the lowest common denominator. Would you believe the Airbus Instructors’ Guide used to have a statement along the lines of ‘Training in unusual attitude recoveries is not necessary in Airbus aircraft, due to the built-in flight envelope protections’!? (That line quietly disappeared a few years ago...) And so we were told that the old-style stick-and-rudder guy was a dinosaur, and what was needed now was more of a systems manager, and someone with a couple of hundred hours in the sim should be just as good as a pilot with 20000 hrs and a strong flying background. That’s partly true - it’s fair to say that automation management, mode awareness, and all the human factors stuff is a vitally important part of being an airline pilot. But then so is a solid grounding in all the old-school stuff, as we’ve seen from a number of recent accidents where it was sadly lacking.
Still, flying is exponentially safer than it ever was before, and a big part of that is down to the systems in the aircraft. We just have to accept that the systems don’t always work as they should, and be able to cope with it when they don’t.
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You make some good points but there is one thing that we are forgetting. A lot of our pilots, especially those that started out in the "Fly by Wire" era and those that did not come from the military don't seem to be very good at flying the airplane without the computer.
There is no such thing as flying without the computer on a fly-by-wire system (military or otherwise), and, many of the capabilities of the airplane wouldn't be possible and/or practical to implement without a computer.
My point is that flying an airplane is a teachable skill, whereas complex systems analysis with limited information in extreme stress situations cannot be taught, and certainly doesn't particularly lend itself to procedures and checklists. Something funny happens, it might be MCAS, or it might be one of the other 100,000 lines of code. You have to be *extremely careful* how complex you make it.
Brett
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There is no such thing as flying without the computer on a fly-by-wire system (military or otherwise), and, many of the capabilities of the airplane wouldn't be possible and/or practical to implement without a computer.
My point is that flying an airplane is a teachable skill, whereas complex systems analysis with limited information in extreme stress situations cannot be taught, and certainly doesn't particularly lend itself to procedures and checklists. Something funny happens, it might be MCAS, or it might be one of the other 100,000 lines of code. You have to be *extremely careful* how complex you make it.
Brett
You are absolutely correct. My point was that much of the teachable skill is not being taught anymore. Many pilots just don't know what to do in that second or two that is the difference between a scary situation and a phone call to your next of kin. I am not saying this from personal experience but through what has been relayed to me from my brother who is a 20 year test pilot who trained airline pilots how to live through the day when "something funny happens" among other things that a sane person would say "no way I am doing that" to.
You are also correct about the "fly by wire" requiring a computer especially in "modern" fighter jets. If you have ever watched an F-18 land on a carrier you will see the stabalator moving up and down like a scared rabbit yet the pilot is barely moving the "stick".
Ken
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I heard something on the radio concerning Pratt-Whitney engines verses the engines Boeing uses, but since I don't have a clue what caused the crash (crashes), I'll keep my mouth shut! D>K
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Airline industry growth is 7%~9% per year for last many years and growing exponentially as many former third world countries are climbing into the 21st century and creating a true middle class
Boeing and AirBus Dominate. They produce an amazing amount of new for sale aircraft each year
Militaries around the world do not graduate enough trained pilots to fill the civilian cargo and people mover needs
Training and certification is a high cost factor
We have the ability right now this day to fly a 747 heavy, with pax, anywhere in the world with no-one in the cockpit.....
I have a family member, high up in the auto insurance industry...a major company... they very much want Automated automobile transport systems used. Very predictable, very reliable, very verifiable, near perfect EVIDENCE in any accident ....litigation can be passed to the manufacture if there is a hardware or software failure......
Talk above that I will not dispute....a well trained human should be IN CONTROL
BUT we don't seem to be able to produce any WELL TRAINED human in enough quantity
Seems counterintuitive to me---- but the last few warrants and officers I knew that retired army aviation were sticker shocked at how little any airline was willing to pay for a commercial pilot.... they recalled back in the 70s~80s airlines were paying a LOT for a commercial pilot
Most that I knew got headhunted by dozens of Life flight Hospital programs that included a move across country...two guys I know well, went to Wisconsin and traded WO-3 pay for triple digit pay after American Eagle Insulted them with their pay package
Just rambling here
But seem to me the industry is NOT interested in WELL TRAINED PILOTS...generally well at least they do not seem willing to properly compensate for the enhanced skills
Have a local rancher (and restaurant owner) neighbor that flies Cargo transport...BIG planes...Dallas to overseas...CRS does not let me remember the aircraft...he is happy with the routing, scheduling, and compensation .......But when we do a single malt scotch evening (grin) he complains loudly about the cost cutting maintenance
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Maybe I was misleading in my simulator comment - my bad. What you cannot simulate is the way you react to stress when you know that everybody is going to die if you get it wrong.
Ken
I must disagree about the stress level in a simulator. In the sim. the thing that is going to die if you get it wrong is your job and you have to live with the humiliation that goes with that. The stress in the sim. is just as great as in the plane if not greater. Airlines cannot use airplanes to train anyone. Sim. time is far less expensive and less dangerous. You don't want to practice imminent stalls in any large or heavy aircraft or any other unusual maneuver.
Your response got my curiosity genes all riled up so I thought I would run this past an acknowledge expert if this field. His response seems to confirm both of our opinions.
So here it is:
"I think the 737Max accidents are a combination of multiple events aligning.
Rush to compete with Airbus
Some flaws in the software design
Reduction in FAA workforce and oversight- driven by the Republicans
Boeing believing that if this emergency manifested- Pilots would be able to react and shut off the trim system because it manifests it self similar to other emergencies- No need to add more words to confuse the pilots. No extra training needed because of the above.
Pilots today are automation cripples. They didn’t grow up hand flying aircraft. In the 70-80’s 75% of US airline pilots were prior military. After 9/11 the number is more like 30%. One of my first things I look at is how to disengage all of the automation. I believe the accident pilots did not disengage the trim.
As far as Simulators- Great training tools, but not a replacement for actual flying. Most of the stress felt in a Sim is performance anxiety. I don’t want to look bad. As long as the sim doesn’t not provide negative training its very valuable. True you can be exposed to multiple emergencies and scenarios that you could not practice in the air and just thinking about it may not be enough."
Ken
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I have no inside information, so the following is again my speculation and my opinion.
"I think the 737Max accidents are a combination of multiple events aligning.
Airplane accidents all pretty much are. A chain of things has to go wrong.
Rush to compete with Airbus
Not me. I've been retired for ten years.
Some flaws in the software design
I doubt that. I think the problem is upstream of software. The system could have been built with no software and would have had the same outcome (in my opinion).
Reduction in FAA workforce and oversight- driven by the Republicans
The Boeing-FAA certification relationship worked fine 20 years ago and probably still does. Now it's getting attention, which is good. Kellyanne is saying the FBI will investigate, which is kinda like sending the FBI to investigate whether sharp stab leading edges help stunt planes. I hope such an investigation concludes that the FAA should be adequately funded, but it looks like we're on the way to ceding airplane certification credibility to the Chinese.
Boeing believing that if this emergency manifested- Pilots would be able to react and shut off the trim system because it manifests it self similar to other emergencies- No need to add more words to confuse the pilots. No extra training needed because of the above.
I don't think that's the reasoning behind the no extra training. Look at the Seattle Times article somebody linked above. I'll leave it at that.
One thing I have heard from the inside is that some guys are on suicide watch. My first thought was that it's too bad they're being watched. Probably the wrong guys are suicidal, though. Then I wondered if things played out the way I think they did, and if I were the MCAS systems guy, if my link in the chain would have held.
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I was disappointed that the Department of Justice was brought in to look at things so soon. Another government agency whose name may be an oxymoron. That starts to imply criminal intent or negligence when an official cause and accident report has not been released and verified yet, and that's just not right. Like Howard mentions, if you have paid attention to previous accidents over the years, there is almost never one underlying cause, but a cascade of events to combine for the catastrophe to occur. I'm still thinking that flight crew inexperience will be the big element here. The Lion Air crash is a prime example. It would have gone down the day before with a different crew, if an experienced pilot from another airline had not been in the jump seat and paying attention. That's two full crews that were unaware how to address the issue. How many more might be out there in the third world countries? That still leaves the decision to be made if there was a flaw in the design or software, but operational history will back up that it could be handled with simple procedures that properly trained and experienced pilots already know. This far down the line from the Ethiopian accident, I'm surprised at least a preliminary report has not been released, given the world wide impact that the grounding has caused. If I sell a car, motorcycle or even a model airplane, I'm kind of careful who I sell it to. Especially if there is some know mechanical issue that needs to be resolved, even though I am completely upfront and vocal about what it is. If I can tell the buyer is a complete idiot and should not own it, I won't sell it to him. It may not be possible to do such a thing on a scale such as a commercial airliner, but it makes simple sense to not sell a product to a customer that does not have the means to properly train it's people on the machine and properly maintain and service it. And that very subject may be an underlying issue here also.
Just my 2 cents worth,
Dan McEntee
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My view considering the latest reports without really knowing what I am talking about.
The airlines are trying to shift the blame to Boeing instead of admitting the pilots screwed up.
Why have we not had any issues with US pilots.
Why on earth would you turn on the very system that caused the problem after turning it off. Because you didn't have enough experience to be able to recover and you were in a panic.
I could be all wet just knowing what I see on the news but it still makes me wonder why we have not had any issues with US pilots and carriers.
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Just posted a link to the preliminary report in a new thread. The new thread has a new subject.
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Why have we not had any issues with US pilots.
There have been reported incidents with US pilots, who turned the MCAS system off. So, the airlines try to shift the blame to Boeing, and US citizens try to shift the blame to furriners. Hmmm -- nope, can't be a pattern here!
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My view considering the latest reports without really knowing what I am talking about.
The airlines are trying to shift the blame to Boeing instead of admitting the pilots screwed up.
Why have we not had any issues with US pilots.
Why on earth would you turn on the very system that caused the problem after turning it off. Because you didn't have enough experience to be able to recover and you were in a panic.
I could be all wet just knowing what I see on the news but it still makes me wonder why we have not had any issues with US pilots and carriers.
Bob, Here are some insights on the Max 8's design and issues..
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1249KS8xtIDKb5SxgpeFI6AD-PSC6nFA5/view?fbclid=IwAR2zzimN8-M2BUSi7N4Wpcgu4FkNtapkqk_SNrQNt2dZWFmmkCDP1ZAezjE
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Bob, Here are some insights on the Max 8's design and issues..
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1249KS8xtIDKb5SxgpeFI6AD-PSC6nFA5/view?fbclid=IwAR2zzimN8-M2BUSi7N4Wpcgu4FkNtapkqk_SNrQNt2dZWFmmkCDP1ZAezjE
In my opinion, that person is almost completely full of @#$%.
Edit: I did not write "@#$%". I wrote an actual word. This is an example of software surprising a user with something unintended. The MCAS issue, I think, is a bit different.
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Bob, Here are some insights on the Max 8's design and issues..
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1249KS8xtIDKb5SxgpeFI6AD-PSC6nFA5/view?fbclid=IwAR2zzimN8-M2BUSi7N4Wpcgu4FkNtapkqk_SNrQNt2dZWFmmkCDP1ZAezjE
Howard's assessment of the article seems about right, bovine scatology - another "big time keyboard expert" gassing on with great authority about something they have no personal experience or training to do. With a dose of conspiracy, which is the hallmark of a crank.
Brett
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Howard's assessment of the article seems about right, bovine scatology - another "big time keyboard expert" gassing on with great authority about something they have no personal experience or training to do. With a dose of conspiracy, which is the hallmark of a crank.
Brett
O.k.. so, what’s your take on it..?
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O.k.. so, what’s your take on it..?
I reserve my "take" until there is some objective information to work with.
Brett
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I reserve my "take" until there is some objective information to work with.
Brett
There are lots of updated infos on facebook, youtube, etc. Here are just some current ones.
https://youtu.be/i2lpTcDeZ2s
https://youtu.be/HBqDcUqJ5_Q
https://youtu.be/aO7_indbfME
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There are lots of updated infos on facebook, youtube, etc. Here are just some current ones.
Well, yes, but is that an indication truth, or an indication that the press has a strong herd instinct?
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If it’s on the internet it must me true! LL~ LL~ LL~
Dennis
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Well, yes, but is that an indication truth, or an indication that the press has a strong herd instinct?
There are much more infos out there.. and seems most all point towards the same conclusion.
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There are lots of updated infos on facebook, youtube, etc. Here are just some current ones.
None of those things looks like an engineering or failure review board report.
Recall that I do this sort of thing for a living for the last nearly 40 years, on things a lot more critical than an airliner, and my "detector" is as finely honed as they get.
Brett